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ABSTRACT
In order for artificial agents to coordinate effectively with people,
they must act consistently with existing conventions (e.g. how to
navigate in traffic, which language to speak, or how to coordinate
with teammates). A group’s conventions can be viewed as a choice
of equilibrium in a coordination game. We consider the problem of
an agent learning a policy for a coordination game in a simulated
environment and then using this policy when it enters an existing
group. When there are multiple possible conventions we show that
learning a policy via multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is
likely to find policies which achieve high payoffs at training time but
fail to coordinate with the real group into which the agent enters. We
assume access to a small number of samples of behavior from the
true convention and show that we can augment the MARL objective
to help it find policies consistent with the real group’s convention.
In three environments from the literature - traffic, communication,
and team coordination - we observe that augmenting MARL with a
small amount of imitation learning greatly increases the probability
that the strategy found by MARL fits well with the existing social
convention. We show that this works even in an environment where
standard training methods very rarely find the true convention of the
agent’s partners.
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INTRODUCTION
A ubiquitous feature of social interaction is a need for individuals to
coordinate [2, 3, 21, 31, 33]. A common solution to the coordination
problem is the establishment of social conventions which control
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daily tasks such as choosing which side of the road to drive on, who
should get right of way during walking, what counts as polite, what
language to speak, or how a team should apportion tasks. If we seek
to construct artificial agents that can coordinate with humans, they
must be able to act according to existing conventions.
In game theory, Nash equilibria are strategies for all players such
that if everyone behaves according to them no individual can improve
their payoff by deviating. In game theoretic models a convention
is one of multiple possible equilibria in a coordination game [21].
Stated in these terms our agent’s task is to construct a policy that
does well when paired with the equilibrium being played by existing
agents.
There has been great recent progress in constructing policies that
can do well in both single and multi-agent environments using deep
reinforcement learning [24, 32]. Deep RL methods typically require
orders of magnitude more experience in an environment to learn
good policies than humans [16], so agents are typically trained in
simulation before being deployed onto the real task.
In zero-sum two-player environments (e.g. Go), it is the policy
of the other player that is simulated during training. Typically, poli-
cies for both players are trained simultaneously or iteratively, in
a process called self-play. Self-play produces successful policies
because if self-play converges then it converges to an equilibrium of
the game [8] and in two-player, zero-sum games all equilibria are
minimax/maximin strategies [36]. Thus, a fully converged strategy
is guaranteed to be unexploitable for the task of interest (e.g. playing
Go with a human champion).
Constructing agents that can cooperate and coordinate with each
other to achieve goals (e.g. work together as team to finish a task)
has been a long running topic in multi-agent reinforcement learning
(MARL) research [12, 23, 34, 37]. However, this literature typically
assumes that the cooperating agents will continue to interact with
those with whom they have been co-trained (this is sometimes re-
ferred to as “centralized training with distributed execution”). In this
case, if MARL converges, it finds an equilibrium and since agents
will play with the same partners they trained with they will achieve
these equilibrium payoffs.
Unfortunately, agents are no longer guaranteed equilibrium pay-
offs if there are multiple equilibria and agents must coordinate with
those they were not trained with (in other words, when we remove the
centralized training assumption). For example, training self-driving
cars in a virtual environment may lead to agents that avoid crashing
into each other during training, but drive on the wrong side of the
road relative to the society they will enter.
In this paper we propose to give the agent access to a small
amount of observations of existing social behavior, i.e. samples of
(state, action) pairs from the test time environment. We focus on
how such data, though it is not enough to purely clone good policies,
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can be used in the training process to learn the best response to
the policies of the future partners. Our key assumption is that the
existing environment already has some existing, stable, social con-
ventions. Thus, our assumption is that future partners will be playing
some equilibrium strategies. In simple environments, agents could
simply enumerate all possible equilibria and choose the one most
consistent with the data. However, in more complex environments
this becomes intractable. We propose to guide self-play toward the
correct equilibrium by training with a joint MARL and behavioral
cloning objective. We call this method observationally augmented
self-play (OSP).
We consider OSP in several multi-agent situations with multiple
conventions: a multi-agent traffic game [28, 35], a particle environ-
ment combining navigation and communication [23, 25] and a Stag
Hunt game where agents must take risks to accomplish a joint goal
[27, 39]. In each of these games we find that self-play can converge
to multiple, incompatible, conventions. We find that OSP is able to
learn correct conventions in these games with a small amount of
observational data. Our results in the Markov Stag Hunt show that
OSP can learn conventions it observes even when those conventions
are very unlikely to be learned using MARL alone.
We do not claim that OSP is the ultimate approach to construct-
ing agents that can learn social conventions. The success of OSP
depends on both the game and the type of objective employed, thus
an exploration of alternative algorithms is an important direction for
future work. Our key result is that the combination of (a) a small
number of samples from trajectories of a multi-agent game, and (b)
knowledge that test time agents are playing some equilibrium gives
much stronger test time performance than either component alone.
RELATED WORK
OSP is related to existing work on adding reward shaping in MARL
[1, 5, 11, 12]. However the domain of interest differs slightly as
reward shaping is typically used to cause all agents in a group to
converge to a high-payoff equilibrium whereas we are interested
in using shaping to guide training to select the correct test-time
equilibrium.
Recent work has pointed out that strategies learned via a single
instance of independent MARL can overfit to other agents’ policies
during training [17]. This work differs from ours in that it suggests
the training of a single best response to a mixture of heterogeneous
policies. This increases the robustness of agent policies but does not
solve the problem of multiple, incompatible conventions that we
study here.
The approach of combining supervised learning from trajectories
with RL has been studied in the single agent case [9]. In that work
the trajectories are expert demonstrations and are used to guide
RL to an optimal policy. In this case supervision is used to speed
up learning while in our work the trajectories are used to select
among many possible optima (equilibria) which may be equivalent
at training time but not at test time. However this literature explores
many methods for combining imitation learning and RL and some
of these techniques may be interesting to consider in the multi-agent
setting.
CONVENTIONS IN MARKOV GAMES
A partially observed Markov game G [22, 29] consists of a set of
players P = {1, . . . ,N }, a set of states S, a set of actions for every
player Ai with the global set A = ×i ∈PAi , a transition function
τ : S × A → ∆S, a reward function for each player that takes as
input the current state and actions Ri : S × A → R. Players have
observation functions Oi : S → Oi and can condition their behavior
on these observations. Markov policies for each player are functions
πi : Oi → Ai . Let Πi denote the set of all policies available to a
player and Π = ×i ∈PΠi be the set of joint policies.1
We use the standard notation π−i to denote the policy vector for all
players other than i. A set of policies π ∈ Π and a (possible random)
initial state s0 ∈ S defines a (random) trajectory of rewards for each
player. We let the value function Vi (s,πi ,π−i ) denote the discounted
expectation of this trajectory. The best response starting at state s for
player i to π−i is BR(s,π−i ) = argmaxπi ∈ΠiVi (s,πi ,π−i ). We let s0
be the (possibly random) initial state of the game.
There are many ways to extend the notion of a Nash equilibrium
to the case of stochastic games. We will consider the Markov perfect
best response. We denote by BR(π−i ) the policy (or policies) which
is a best response starting at any state and consider equilibria to be
policies for each player π such that each πi ∈ BR(π−i ).2
We consider games with multiple, incompatible, conventions. For-
mally we say that conventions (equilibrium policy sets) π and π ′ are
incompatible if the compound policy (πi ,π ′−i ) is not an equilibrium.
The goal of training is to compute a policy πi which is a best
response to the existing convention π test−i . During training, the agent
has access to the environment but receives only a limited set of
observations of π test in the form of a set D of state-action pairs
sampled from π test . This is summarized in Figure 1.
We denote a generic element of D by d = (s,ak ) which is a
(state, action) pair for agent k . Let Dj denote the subset of D which
includes actions for agent j.
The dataset D may be insufficient to identify a best response to
all possible policies π test consistent with D. However, the set of
equilibrium policy sets is typically much smaller than all possible
policy sets. Therefore, if we assume that all agents are minimizing
regret then we must only consider equilibrium policy sets consistent
with D.
Given a game G and dataset D, a brute force approach to learn a
policy compatible with the conventions of the group the agent will
enter would be to compute the equilibrium π∗ of G that maximizes
the likelihood of D. Formally this is given by
π∗ ∈ argmaxπ
∑
i
∑
(s,a)∈Di
log(πi (s,a))
s.t. ∀i, πi ∈ BR(π−i ).
This constrained optimization problem quickly becomes intractable
and we will instead try to find an equilibrium using multi-agent
1We consider only Markov policies in this work so that we can work with individual state-
action pairs, although our same approach could be applied across observed trajectories
to learn non-Markov policies (i.e. policies conditioned on their full history).
2There are weaker notions, for example, requiring that policies are best responses
at every state reached during play. It is known that Markov perfect equilibria are
harder to find by learning [8] and it is interesting to consider whether different kinds of
choices (e.g. on-policy vs. off-policy learning) can make stronger or weaker convergence
guarantees. However, these questions are outside the scope of this paper.
learning, and use D to increase the probability learning converges
to it.
Figure 1: A graphical description of our problem. Our central
question is how to use observational data to make sure that
training converges to the same convention as the group which
our agent will enter.
Observationally Initialized Best Response
Dynamics
To get an intuition about how data can be used during training
we will first study a learning rule where analytic results are more
easily obtained. We will begin with the simplest multi-agent learning
algorithm: best response dynamics in a 2 player Markov game where
equilibria are in pure policies and are incompatible.
In best response dynamics each player begins with a policy ini-
tialized at π 0i . Players alternate updating their policy with the best
response π ti = BR(π t−1−i ). When there are multiple best responses we
assume there is a (non-randomized) tie-breaking rule used to select
one. Given an equilibrium A we denote by ΠA the basin of attraction
of A (the set of initial states from which BR dynamics converge to
A.)
A naive way to use the observed data is to force the policies
be consistent with D at each step of the best response dynamic
by changing it at each states where it differs. However, this can
introduce new equilibria to the game.3
In the context of reward shaping it is well known that the way
to avoid the introduction of new equilibria is to use potential based
reward shaping [5], or, equivalently, use our information to only
change the initialization of learning [38]. We will follow this advice
and study observationally initialized best response dynamics. We
begin with a policy π0 chosen at random. However, for every player
i and state-action pair (s,a) in the data D we form π¯ 0 by setting the
corresponding action of π 0i (s) to a. We then perform best response
dynamics from this new initialization.
We will now discuss a class of games for which we can guar-
antee that observationally initialized best response dynamics have
a larger basin of attraction for the equilibrium from which D was
drawn relative to standard best response dynamics. This class is a
generalization of a commonly used matrix game class: games with
strategic complements [4]. For our purposes strategic complements
3For a simple example consider a game where 5 agents choose an action A or B and
receive reward equal to the number of other agents whose actions match theirs. In this
case there are equilibria where all agents choose A or all agents choose B. If we restrict
one agent to always choose A we can introduce a new equilibrium where 4 agents
choose B and one agent chooses A.
corresponds to assuming that one’s partners behave more consis-
tently with some convention then one is also more incentivized to
behave according to that convention.4 In existing work strategic
complements are defined with respect to a single action rather than
a Markov policy. To generalize to Markov games we introduce a
notion of distance between policies:
DEFINITION 1 (POLICY CLOSENESS). Given a player i and
target policy A we say that policy π is weakly closer to A than
policy π ′ if on all states either π (s) = π ′(s) or π (s) = A(s). We
denote this by π ≿A π ′.
Policy closeness gives us a partial ordering on policies which we
use to generalize the idea of strategic complements.
DEFINITION 2 (MARKOV STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTS). A Markov
game exhibits Markov strategic complements if for any equilibrium
A = (A1,A2) we have that πi ≿Ai π ′i implies that BR(πi ) ≿A−i
BR(π ′i ).
Let DA be a dataset drawn from equilibrium A by sampling states
and their equilibrium actions. Let Π¯A(DA) be the basin of attraction
of A given observationally initialized best response dynamics.
THEOREM 1. If a game where best-response dynamics always
converge exhibits Markov strategic complements then for any DA
drawn from a equilibriumAΠA ⊆ Π¯A(DA) and there exists (s,Ai (s))
such that if (s,Ai (a)) ∈ DA then ΠA ⊂ Π¯A(DA).
We relegate the proof to the Appendix. Roughly, it has two steps:
first, we show that if π0 is in the basin of attraction ofA then anything
closer toA is also in the basin. Second, we show that there is an initial
state that is not in the basin of attraction of best response dynamics
but is in the basin of attraction of observationally initialized best
response dynamics. Because initialization can increase the basin of
attraction without introducing any new equilibria the observed data
can strictly improve the probability that we learn a policy consistent
with the observed agents.
EXPERIMENTS
Observationally Augmented Self-Play
We wish to use the insights from initialization in environments where
function approximation (e.g. with deep neural networks) is required.
However, if the policy is computed via function approximation, it is
not clear how to ‘initialize’ its value at particular states. Specifically,
the policy at the small number of states in D can only be expected to
generalize if the approximation captures the regularities of the game,
which will only be true after some interaction in the environment.
Therefore, we consider a procedure where consistency with D is
enforced during training and smoothly decays over time.
We consider training with stochastic gradient descent using a loss
function which is a linear combination of the likelihood of the data
(a supervised objective) plus the policy gradient estimator of the
4In economic applications the notion of strategic complements is utilized in production
games and roughly corresponds either the the idea of network effects (the more people
use some product the higher a consumer’s utility is from using that product) or a joint
monotonicity condition (if Firm X produces cars and firm Y produces car washing
materials if firm X produces more cars then firm Y sees higher demand for car washing
materials). See the Supplement for a more formal discussion.
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Figure 2: In the traffic game 10 agents navigate a grid world to reach goals (first panel). Agents have a local field of view (indicated in
green). Two incompatible conventions emerge across multiple training runs. MARL agents achieve high rewards with their training
partners (diagonal) but lower rewards with incompatible partners (second panel). Visualizing these conventions shows that they
differ in which side of the road to drive on (third panel). Given few observations for each agent OSP learns the correct test time
convention (fourth panel), approaching the reward of centralized training (black dashed line), while supervised training does not.
The dashed line indicates the average reward of separate self-play training, and error bars represent 95% confidence intervals derived
from independent replicates.
reward in the game (we denote by LPG the negative of this quantity).
Formally, each agent receives rewards given by
LOSPi (πi ,π−i ) = LPG (πi | π−i ) + λ
∑
(s,a)∈Di
log(πi (s,a))
with respect to the parameters θi of its policy.5
We optimize the joint objective using MARL. At any time t when
making an update to the parameters of each agent θi we will take
gradient steps of the form
∇OSPt (θi ,D) = ∇PGt (θi ) + λt∇sup (θi ,D).
Where ∇PG is our policy gradient and ∇sup is the gradient of the
supervised objective at θi .6
5Note this is different from reward shaping as the probably that a state is reached does
not affect the supervised loss of the policy.
6As with the best response dynamics above using a compound objective with a constant
λ can, in theory, introduce new equilibria during training. To be sure this does not occur
we can anneal the weight on the supervised loss over time with limt→∞ λt = 0. In
practice, however, using a fixed λ in our environments appeared to create policies that
were still consistent with test time equilibria thus suggesting that if new equilibria were
introduced they did not have large basins of attraction for our policy-gradient based
learning procedures.
Our main analysis is experimental and we use three environments
from the literature: traffic, language games, and risky coordination.
Our main results are:
RESULT 1 (EXPERIMENTS 1,2,3). OSP greatly increases the
probability our agent learns a convention compatible with test time
agents in situations where standard self-play by itself does not guar-
antee good test time performance and D is insufficient to learn a
good policy by behavioral cloning alone.
RESULT 2 (EXPERIMENT 3). OSP can find conventions that
have a small basin of attraction for MARL alone. Thus OSP can
be used in situations where self-play will rarely find a test-time
compatible convention.
For all experiments, we represent the states using simple neural
networks. The first two experiments have relatively low dimensional
state representations so we use two layer MLPs with 128 hidden
units per layer and ELU non-linearities. Our third experiment has
a grid structure so we represent the state using the convolutional
neural network architecture from [27].
For RL training we use A3C using a multi-agent variant of the
pytorch-a3c package [15] run on 40 threads. We use 20 step returns
and γ = .99. We use the Adam method for optimization [13]. For
OSP, we add the supervised term to the A3C loss with λ = 1, using
minibatches from D of size 20. Environment-specific parameters are
detailed in the subsections below. In each experiment we compare
the performance of OSP for various sizes of D. We populate D with
actions for all agents for states sampled at uniform intervals from
true test time play.
Traffic
We first consider a multi-agent traffic navigation game inspired by
[35]. Each of 10 agents begins at a random edge of a grid and can
move around in each of the 4 cardinal directions or stand still (see
Figure 2). Each agent is given a goal to reach. When the agent
reaches the goal they receive a reward of +1 and then a new goal.
If agents collide with another agent or wall they receive a negative
reward (−5 for colliding with another agent, −.1 for colliding with
a wall). Agents do not have full observation of the environment.
Rather, they have access to the position of their goal relative to
themselves and a local view of any other agents nearby. We train
agents for a total of 800, 000 episodes.7
We train 20 replicates and see that two incompatible conventions
emerge. This can be seen in Figure 2 where we plot payoffs to an
agent from one replicate paired with 9 agents from another. We
visualize the conventions by taking the empirical average action
taken by any agent in any of the possible traffic coordinate locations
(Figure 2 panel 3). We find that the two conventions that emerge are
similar to the real world: either agents learn to drive on the left of
the road or they learn to drive on the right.
We now train agents using OSP and insert them into environments
with 9 pre-converged agents. The test time payoffs to the transplanted
agent for various sizes of D are shown in Figure 2 panel 4 top. The
dashed line corresponds to the expected payoff of an agent trained
using standard self-play (no observations). We see 20 observations
(2 observations for each of the 10) agents is sufficient to guide OSP
to compatible conventions. The bottom panel shows that this is not
enough data to train a good strategy via behavioral cloning alone
(i.e. using just the supervised objective).
Language
An important type of convention is language. There is a resurgence
of interest in the deep RL community in using communication games
to construct agents which are able to communicate [6, 10, 18, 23].
We now apply OSP to the cooperative communication task in the
particle environment studied by [23] and [25]. In this environment
there are two agents, a speaker and a listener, and three landmarks
(blue, red, or green). One of the landmarks is randomly chosen as
a goal and the reward for both agents at each step is equal to the
distance of the listener from the landmark. However, which landmark
is the goal during a particular episode is only known to the speaker
who is able to produce a communication output from a set of 20
symbols. To solve the cooperation task, agents thus need to evolve
a simple ‘language’. This language only requires 3 symbols to be
7We found it necessary to ramp the collision penalty linearly over the first 400, 000
episodes to avoid agents becoming stuck in the local minima of never moving.
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Figure 3: In the speaker/listener particle environment (first
panel taken from the original paper) when a pair are trained
together they can reach high payoffs (black dashed line) but
pairs trained separately with self-play (red dashed line) per-
form quite poorly. OSP leads to agents that reach high payoffs
with their test time partner. Supervision alone is insufficient to
construct good Listener agents (plot is below the y axis for N <
1024). Error bars represent confidence intervals derived from
independent replicates.
used, but this still allows for at least 6840 incompatible conventions
(one symbol per landmark).
In this experiment we use a lower discount factor of γ = .8 and
as suggested by [23] we also use a centralized critic. It was shown
in prior work that if artificial agents learn language by self-play they
can learn arbitrary languages which may not be compatible with new
partners [18]. Indeed, when we pair two agents who were trained
separately they clearly do not speak the same language - i.e. they
cannot communicate and so achieve low payoffs.
We look at the effect of adding observational data to the training
of either a speaker or listener (we train a total of 135 replicates to
convergence). In the case of the speaker (whose policy is a simple
map from goals to communication symbols) supervision is sufficient
to learn the a good test-time language. However, pure behavioral
cloning fails catastrophically for the listener. Again, OSP with a rel-
atively small number of observations is able to achieve high payoffs
(Figure 3).
Risky Coordination
We now consider a risky coordination game known as the Stag Hunt.
The matrix game version of the Stag Hunt has both agents choosing
either to Hunt (an action that require coordination) or Forage (a
safe action). Foraging yields a sure (low) payoff whereas Hunting
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Figure 4: In the Stag Hunt independent MARL typically con-
verges to the safe equilibrium. Thus, an agent trained via
MARL cannot coordinate when matched with a test-time part-
ner who choose to hunt. However OSP, with samples from the
Hunt equilibrium, can converge to the Hunting convention dur-
ing training reaching a payoff almost as high as two Hunters
trained together (green line). Error bars represent confidence
intervals derived from independent replicates.
yields a high payoff if the other agent chooses to Hunt also and a
low payoff if one shows up alone. It is known that in both matrix and
Markov versions of Stag Hunt games many standard self-play based
algorithms yield agents that converge to the inefficient equilibrium
in which both agents choose safe actions. This happens because
while our partner is not hunting effectively (i.e. early in training), the
payoff to hunting ourselves is quite low. Thus, the basin of attraction
of joint hunting is much smaller than the basin of attraction of both
foraging.
This situation is different from the ones in traffic and language:
here there are multiple conventions (hunt or forage) but they are not
payoff equivalent (hunting is better) nor do they have similar sized
basins of attraction (hunting is very difficult to find via standard
independent MARL).
We use the Markov version of Stag Hunt introduced by [27] where
two agents live on a 8 × 8 grid. Two plants and a stag are placed at
random locations. If an agent moves over a plant, it receives a reward
of 1. Stepping on the stag gives a reward of 5 to both players if they
step on it simultaneously, otherwise there is no reward. When either
a plant or stag is stepped on, it restarts in a new location. Games last
100 rounds.
We start by constructing a test time hunting partner by inducing
joint hunting strategies in 40 replicates. Because MARL by itself
does not find hunt equilibria, we construct a hunting partner by
training an agent under a modified payoff structure (payoff of 0 for
plants; payoff of 0.1 for unilateral hunting).
We then test whether we can train agents in the original game
who can coordinate with test time partners that hunt. We use OSP
with varying amounts of data from the hunting agents. We see that
with moderate amounts of data OSP often converges to the hunting
convention at test time even though two agents trained together
using independent MARL fail to find the high payoff joint stag
equilibrium in any of the replicates. As a result, OSP outperforms
even centralized self-play because the observations of the risky
partner guide the agent to a better equilibrium. As with the traffic and
language environments above we see that pure behavioral cloning is
insufficient to construct good test time strategies (Figure 4).
CONCLUSION
Conventions are an important part of social behavior and many multi-
agent environments support multiple conventions as equilibria. If
we want to construct artificial agents that can adapt to people (rather
than requiring people to adapt to them) these agents need to be able
to act according to the existing social conventions. In this paper we
have discussed how a simple procedure that combines small amounts
of imitation learning with self-play can lead to agents that can learn
social conventions.
There are many open questions remaining in the study of conven-
tions and building agents that can learn them quickly. OSP uses a
straightforward combination of RL and behavioral cloning. It would
be interesting to explore whether ideas from the learning with ex-
pert demonstrations literature [9]. In addition, OSP follows current
deep RL paradigms splits strategy construction into a training and a
test phase. An interesting extension is to consider the OSP training
strategies can be fine-tuned during test time.
We have focused on situations where agents have no incentive to
deviate from cooperation and only need to learn correct conventions.
An important future direction is considering problems where agents
have partially misaligned incentives but, in addition to just solving
the social dilemma, must also coordinate on a convention [7, 14, 19,
20, 26].
There is a large recent interest in hybrid systems which include
both human and artificially intelligent participants [30]. Thus, an-
other key extension of our work is to understand whether techniques
like OSP can construct agents that can interact with humans in more
complex environments.
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APPENDIX
Relationship Between Markov Strategic
Complements and Strategic Complements
The original definition of strategic complements comes from games
with continuous actions used to model multiple firms in a market.
In the simplest example we have multiple firms which produce
units of goods (x1,x2, . . . ,xn ). The revenue function of each firm i
is Ri (xi ,x−i ) where Ri is smooth, strictly concave, increasing and
has Ri (xi = 0,x−i ) = 0. The goods are strategic complements if
∂2Ri
∂xi∂x j
> 0, in other words goods are strategic complements if
“more ‘aggressive’ play... by one firm... raises the marginal profitabil-
ities [of the others].” [4] Firms have costs of production given by
ci (xi ) which has c(0) = 0, c ′(0) = 0, is convex, and increasing. Thus
each firm’s objective function is
Ri (xi ,x−i ) − ci (xi )
If firm −i is producing x−i then firm i’s best response x∗i (x−i ) sets
∂Ri (x∗i (x−i ),x−i )
∂xi
=
∂ci (x∗i (x−i )
∂xi
.
Given the definition of strategic complements above this means that
∂x∗i
∂x j
> 0 for all other firms j.
Strategic complements implies our Markov strategic complements
in a matrix game with multiple equilibria (since any firm changing
their production level higher or lower causes other firms to also
want to change their production). Markov strategic complements is
weaker than strategic complements in matrix games since it only pins
down how best responses to shift when others change to equilibrium
actions rather than any action shift (though if action spaces in each
state were totally ordered one could amend the definition to keep all
of the properties).
Proof of Main Theorem
Lemma 1: In a Markov strategic complements (MSC) game, any
policy π in the basin of attraction of an equilibrium A remains there
under observational initialization, i.e. πi ∈ ΠA =⇒ π¯i (DA) ∈ ΠA.
We define the operator BR(k ) as k iterations of the best response
operator,
BR(k )(πi ) = BRi (BR−i (BRi (. . . BR−i (πi )))).
Consider an initial policy πi ∈ ΠA for some equilibrium A. There
exists kc such that BR(kc ) = Ai . Now consider an observationally
initialized policy π¯i (DA) for some dataset D drawn from Ai . By
definition, this implies that π¯i ≿A πi . Now, since the game is MSC,
BR−i (π¯i (DA)) ≿A BR−i (πi ).
By repeated application of the MSC property, we find that for all k,
BR(k )(π¯i (DA)) ≿A BR(k )(πi ).
To conclude, we note that BR(kc )(π¯ 0i (DA)) ≿A Ai , which implies
BR(kc )(π¯i (DA)) = Ai .
Lemma 2: In a MSC game with a finite number of states, there
exists a state s such that for any DA that contains the state-action
pair (s,Ai (s)), there is a policy not in the basin of attraction of A
but which enters the basin of attraction of A under observational
initialization.
Consider a policy π 0i < ΠA, and order the states lexicographically
(s1, s2, . . . , sM ). Now consider the sequence of policies πki where
πki (sl ) = Ai (sl ) for l < k and πki (sl ) = π 0(sl ) for k ≥ l . We
know that πMi = Ai ∈ ΠA, therefore there exists some t such that
π ti < ΠA and π
t+1
i ∈ ΠA. Now, consider a dataset DA containing
the state-action pair (st+1,Ai (st+1)). Then π¯ ti (DA) ≿A π t+1. As
discussed in the last section, if π t+1 ∈ ΠA and π¯ ti (DA) ≿A π t+1,
then π¯ ti (DA) ∈ ΠA. Therefore, for any dataset containing st+1, the
policy π ti enters the basin of attraction of A under observational
initialization.
